Far Eastern Economic Review
Reference: Vol. 74, No. 47, 20 Nov 1971, 20

COVER STORY

Faith in Bengal's Fighters

A. Hariharan| New Delhi

A NEWSPAPER columnist in New Delhi predicted that an Indo-Pakistan war would start on November 20 -- soon after the 40-day Moslem fast of Ramadan ends; obviously no army fights on an empty stomach. But time was not lost during the holy fast by PPP (Pakistan People's Party) leader Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. His pilgrimage took him to Peking, not to wash away sins but to strengthen the sinews of war -- or at least the promises behind them.

For weeks Indians have been asking themselves when -- not if -- war will be upon them. Civil defence measures and blackout trials have added to the sense of urgency. But with the end of Ramadan, tension declined markedly -- largely due to Premier Indira Gandhi's Western tour.

It is conceded that Mrs Gandhi failed to bring about an appreciable change in official US attitudes, but she created a powerful impression and it is felt that whatever the official reactions, public opinion abroad at least is much better informed of the Indian stand. A London Times editorial on the eve of her visit to Britain said that India's links with the Bangla Desh guerillas were understandable and perhaps even inevitable.

Nor was the irony lost on Washington reporters when Mrs Gandhi commented that the US Senate decision to cut off foreign aid was an internal problem of the US affecting many nations. She projected forcefully India's impatience with international myopia regarding Bangla Desh.

But for a solution of the refugee problem, India must rely on the success of the Mukti Bahini (liberation forces) -- unless President Yahya Khan's regime starts to negotiate a settlement with the imprisoned leader of the Awami League, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. India may be wrong to assume the Mukti Bahini's activities can permit the refugees to return in the next few months. Many believe there will be prolonged turmoil and fighting in East Pakistan before Islamabad realises the futility of trying to keep 70 million people under the jackboot.

But each move by the Pakistan army in the eastern wing is yielding fewer returns. Collective penalties do not ensure obedience; and there are too few troops to cover the whole area. Until last month, the army's four or five divisions were deployed over strategic areas and communications centres. This left the border with India open, enabling the millions of refugees to cross comparatively safely -- and admirers in India to send sizable supplies to the freedom fighters. When the army, realising the border must be sealed, redeployed the troops along it, the Mukti Bahini was able to step up its campaign within Bangla Desh and seize control of large parts of the Sylhet, Mymensingh and Khustia districts.

Unless Islamabad can transport several more divisions to the eastern wing -- and supply them -- the Mukti Bahini cannot be crushed. And its resources are not diminishing: this month it claimed it had obtained helicopters from abroad and was in the process of forming the nucleus of an airforce. The Bengalis were well represented in the Pakistan navy -- being, unlike the Punjabis, seafarers. Trained Bengali naval personnel have deserted en masse and the Mukti Bahini, though it has no ships, can call on these men to harass shipping in East Bengal's two principal ports, Chittagong and Chulna.

About 16 naval supply vessels have been damaged or sunk so far, including some flying Greek, American or Turkish flags. Shipping lines have been faced with 100% increases in insurance charges on cargoes and vessels bound for East Bengal; they have passed on the cost or refused to unload there at all. At Karachi itself cargo intended for the eastern wing have been stranded for lack of berthing and handling facilities at Chittagong.

Islamabad's biggest headache -- the maintenance of supplies -- will get worse as the army is further harassed. Most of the 50,000 men of the East Pakistan Rifles and the police are believed to have escaped the March massacre; they have trained thousands more in the use of arms, sabotage and ambush techniques. At least 100,000 volunteers are under training.

The Pakistan government also has to contend with discontent among the troops and police sent from the west to East Bengal. Dispatched at short notice, they expected it to be a jaunt lasting a couple of weeks. As the months went by and an undisclosed number of their comrades were shipped back in illmade coffins, rations ran short and even munitions were less than plentiful, they wanted to go home. Now they won't be back for the Id festival marking the end of Ramadan or for Christmas either. They are ignorant of the Bengali language and surrounded by a hostile population. The heroes of the spring massacres are demoralised.

New Delhi hopes that in a few months large chunks of territory contiguous with the Indian border will be under Mukti Bahini control, enabling the refugees to begin their return journey. When they do go "home," things will get worse for the army.

Meanwhile India has taken the Chinese statements on the occasion of Bhutto's Peking visit calmly. New Delhi is aware that Bhutto has been the principal architect of the Peking-Islamabad axis. But at home, Bhutto is a frustrated man; that the military regime sought to use him says less about Peking's anxiety to keep faith with an old friend than about Islamabad's need for a stunt to boost morale. Yahya can now tell his people that China's steadfastness balances Soviet friendship for India.

America, China and the Soviet Union tend to talk the same language: the need for peace in the subcontinent, the desirability of bilateral talks; they all favour a political solution to Bangla Desh, not a military one. After claiming that East Bengal is an internal problem of Pakistan, Yahya has been trying hard to make it an international issue, putting India in the dock. He appears to have failed. And it is this failure that may still start a shooting war.

The Indian assessment is that Pakistan may aim thus to bring about big power or UN intervention as in 1965 -- another Tashkent, where the Bengalis will be lectured on the need to support the integrity of the Pakistani nation. Since independence India has fought, three times: twice with Pakistan, in 1948 and 1965, and once with China in 1962. On all three occasions it was unprepared. Today the situation is different. Both the armed forces and the people are fully prepared for the worst.

Trial blackouts have been failures before: the October and November trials were total successes. Postal and telegraph employees have volunteered to work one hour extra every day to expedite all communications. Ordnance factories are working to maximum capacity and labour disputes have been put in cold storage. Villagers are patrolling railway tracks round the clock to prevent sabotage. Everywhere there is an awareness that the nation is threatened and of the individual's duty and responsibility. On the eve of Mrs Gandhi's tour abroad, all opposition party leaders called on her to pledge their unstinted support in the event of an emergency.

Military leaders and politicians both say India will not repeat the mistakes of 1965 when action was not decisive enough. Now they talk of dealing Pakistan a blow it will remember for generations. The Himalayan passes and heights are largely snowbound. India has withdrawn part of the 10 mountain divisions guarding the northern and northeastern frontier. They army's striking power has been considerably enhanced with new weapons. General Harbaksh Singh, former head of the Western Command, claims it could take the Indian army three to four weeks to overcome all resistance in East Bengal in the event of war. It would depend, he added, on the amount of force India was willing to employ: it would be well advised to wield a hammer to swat a fly.

There are no doubt hawks and doves in the Indian Foreign Ministry. But the chances of an unwanted war through some hasty action by hawks here still are far less than those of similar action by the hawks in Islamabad.